Yale University

EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale
Discussion Papers

Economic Growth Center

12-1-1973

Distribution and Production Implications of Land Reform
Mark Gersovitz

Follow this and additional works at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/egcenter-discussion-paper-series

Recommended Citation
Gersovitz, Mark, "Distribution and Production Implications of Land Reform" (1973). Discussion Papers.
202.
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/egcenter-discussion-paper-series/202

This Discussion Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Economic Growth Center at EliScholar – A
Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. It has been accepted for inclusion in Discussion Papers by an
authorized administrator of EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. For more information,
please contact elischolar@yale.edu.

ECONOMIC GROWTH CENTER
YALE UNIVERSITY
Box 1987, Yale Station
New Haven, Connect icut

CENTER DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 194

DISTRIBUTION AND PRODUCTION IMPLICATIONS OF LAND REFORM

Mark Gersovi tz

December 1973

Note:

Center Discuss ion Papers are prelimin ary materia ls
circulat ed to stimula te discussi on and critica l
comment. Referenc es in publica tions to Discuss ion
Papers should be cleared with the author to protect
the tentativ e characte r of these papers.

Distribution and Production Implications of Land Reform
Mark Gersovitz

Abstract

This paper discusses alternative explanations of the empirically
established inverse relation between the size of farm and the output-land
and labour-land ratios used in •~r1.cultural production in less developed
countries.

The analysis establishes the implications ~f the various explana

tions for changes in income distribution and the volume of agricultural
output associated with different types of.land refom programs.

These im

plications are rather heterogeneous, and are extremely sensitive to the
particular explanation of the production ratio pattern which is adopted.

Distri bution and Produ ction Implic ations of Land Reform*
Mark Gerso vitz

The common chara cteris tic .of the many divers e land reform scheme
s is
that they all involv e the re-all ocatio n of land owner ship. This
re-all oca
tion of factor owners hip is, of course , accompanied by a redist ributi
on of
income and a change in the size of the produc ing units. These
chang es, in
their turn, have implic ations for the volume of agricu ltural outpu
t.
A large empir ical litera ture discus ses eviden ce on the relatio
nship

bet~ee n fann size (measured in acres) and output in less develo ped
count ries. 1
The concen sus is that there exists an invers e relati on betwee n
farm size and
outpu t per acre. Furthe r, there is some eviden ce of an invers e
relati on be
tween the labour -land ratio and farm size. 2 These empir ical relatio
nship s
have been widely constr ued as justif ying land reform s which break
up large
holdin gs as likely to increa se agricu ltural outpu t.

Thus, Dorne r conclu des:

"The dilemma of the hard choice s count ries must make - betwee n
distri butiv e
justic e and economic effici ency or advanc ement - is not a real issue.
"3, 4

*I am gratef ul to Robert E. Evenson and James L. McCabe who made helpfu l
comments
on an earlie r draft of this paper.

1For a survey of some
eviden ce see Peter Dorne r and Don Kanel , "The Economic
Case for Land Reform" in Peter Dorne r (ed.), Land Reform in Latin
Ameri ca,
Madis on, 1971.
2Pete r Dorne r, Land Reform
101-10 3.

&

Economic Develo pment, Harmondsworth, 1972, pp.

3Toid ., p.141.
4As well, see
E. J. Long, "The Economic Basis of Land Reform in Underd evelop ed
Count ries", Land Econo mics, vol. 37 (1961 ), p.115.
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Berry has dissented from this optimistic view.

Investigating a model

with three groups (landless labourers, small farmers and large landowners),
Berry argued that "while land redistribution may be expected to raise agri
cultural output in any cases, it may well worsen the distribution of income
by lowering the demand for hired labour. 11 5 Cases where- landless labourers
can be hurt are characterized by a redistribution of land from landowners to
small farmers.
Before the relationship between land refom, income distribution and
production can be established, it is imperative that the mechanism by which
farms of different sizes operate with different output-land and labour-land
ratios is explicitly integrated into the analysis.

While many reasons hav-e

been suggested to explain the phenomenon of differing production ratios,
differences in their implications for income distribution and production within
the context of land refom have not been investigated.

Among the reasons

given for the observed differences in these ratios, three deserve special
attention.

For ease of refet-ence, they may be labelled as the measurement,

market failure and large landowner inefficiency explanations. Two basic pre-reform situations with correspondingly different land
-reform schemes may be distinguished.

In the simplest (A) case, there are only

t110 groups, landowners and landless labourers. Since there are no small farms,
any assessment of production ratio differences between differant sized units
must base itself on cross-country comparisons.

It is assumed that production

ratio relationships observed in countries with small farms would be valid in
the country under consideration if it were also to have a small farm sector.
Alternatively, the country under consideration may be assumed to have a small

5R. Albert Berry, "Land Refom and the Agricultural IncOllle Distribution",
Pakistan Development Review, vol. 21 (1971), p.32.
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f ann. sector which is insignificant in size, but whose behaviour nonetheless
substantiates the expected productipn ratio pattern.

Under either inteiyre

tation, the relevant land refonn scheme is one of all land to the landless
labourers.
The second pre-reform situation is the Berry (B) case, with landowners,
small (landowning) fann.eps and landless labourers.

In this case, the land

refonn. scheme under consideration is one of all land to the small farmers.

A

scheme which re-allocated land to both small fann.ers and landless labourers

would be similar to case A.

Thus, the A and B cases can be considered as

polar situations.
Throughout the analysis, the focus is on the decision individuals
make between leisure and consumption.

The agricultural sector under examina

tion is assumed to be part of an economy wlaich is small relative to the world
economy so,ithat its relative prices are given by the international market. In
\

particular, the .relative prices of agricultural and non-agricultural goods
are assumed constant, pemitting the suppression of non-agricultural goods in
the analysis.

Initially, it is assumed that labour is 1-obile between the

agricultural and non-agricultural sectors.

This assumption is subsequently

removed without qualifying the results to any significant degree.

-4Land Reform and the Measurement E]cplanation:
A measurement explanation of the difference iri production ratios

simply asserts that land is nonhomogeneous and that this non-homogeneity leads
to the observed production ratio relationships.

Under assumptions of perfect

competition-, all farms would operate with the same production ratios when land
is measured in fertility equivalent acres.

In empirical work, however, land

is measured in yardstick acres and fams composed of lress fertile land will
have lower o~tput-land and labour-land ratios.
Further, there is a natural tendency for farms whose land is less fer
tile to domin•te the larger size groups.

Consider a simple .,case with only two

grades of land, typ·e one of $Uperior f ertilit,- and type tw<;> of inferior fertil
ity.

Suppose that the distribution of faffl; size functions for farms composed

of the two,types of land are f (x) and r (x) where xis fam size in yardstick
1
2
acres. Let one yardstick acre of type one land be a l!ftandard fertility acre
and let

k) 1

yardstick ~cres of type two land equal one standa:rd fertility

acre. Assume that there are equal amounts of standard fertility acres of each
tyPe,·and, further, that

r 1(x)

= f 2(kx).

Then, the di~tribution for all farms

is F(x) = [f1 (x)+r (x)J/2, and fams with type two land and low production
2
ratios tend to dominate the large size classes (Figure I).
While the asSllllption of non~homogeneous land provides a complete
explanation for observed variations in product.ion ratios, it is fully compa
tible with the usual co111petitive assumptions.

Indeed,_when land is measured

in equivalent fertility acres, the non-homogeneous land model reduces to the
simple competitive model.
to be standardized.

For convenience, therefore, all land is assumed

The analysis is relevant to both the competitive case and

to the non-hOP1ogeneous land case after a retranslation of results from standard
to yardstick acres.
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Figure I

X

-6In Figure IIa, the pre-reform equilibrium of the agricultural sector
is illustrated under ease A assUMptions,

output as a function of labour input,

given the amount of land, is given by the cu?'Ve AB,

Labour input is measured

from right to left starting at the origin B,. The production function AB can
then be interpreted as a production possibility frontier between agricultural
output and leisure with respect to the origin O.
time available to the land'less labourer commu.ni ty.

OB is the total amount of
A set of this group• s

community indifference curves is plotted with origin

o.

The •ge is assuaed

equal to the m&rginal product of labour given by the slope of the line E D
0
equal to the slope· of the line

·ca.

Equilibrium will be characterized by two

points such as E0 and E , with demand for labour equal to supply of labour.
1
Now consider a land refrom which transfers all land to the landless
labourers.

Assume that neither leisure nor agricutural goods are inferior.

At a (shadow) wage_ given by the slope of the old wage line E D, ,the landless
0
labourer community will reach the highest level of utility somewhere along
E0 J, say at E2 •

This position is not, however, a final equilibirium since the

production of leisU?'e and the agricultural good (given by point E0 ) is not
equal to the d0Jft8.nd for leisure and the agricultural good (given by·point E ).
2
Final equilibrium is attained at sonte point elong the arc E K, say at EJ°
0

At E3, the total output of the agricultural good has fallen. Thus,
the measurement explanation under case A assumptions leads to an unaabiguous
decline in agricultural output following land reform.

This, result is associ

ated with.the role which leisure, as a nom.al good, plays in the determination
of the level of labour input.

Consumption (and welfare) of the landless

laboU?'er COffllllunity has, of course, increased.
Equilibrium under case B assUlllptions is illustrated for the small
farmer and landowner sectors

in Figures IIIa and b respectively.

In Figure
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IIIa, the small farmer group's indifference map is drawn with origin O,
curve AB is a production possibility frontier given the 8.Jllount of land held
by small farmers and total time available to small farmers is OB.

With the

equilibrium wage given by the slope of E0 D (equal to the slopes of e 0 d and
cf in Figure IIIb), small farmers wish to work FG (equal to fb in Figure IIIb)
hours on the landowners' land.
In Figure IIIb, the landless labourer group is assumed to have an
indifference map With origin o, ab is a production possibility frontier given
the amount of land owned by landowners, and total tim.e available to landless
labourers· is of.

Equilibrium is given by a pair of points e 0 and e 1 with

demand for labour on the part of landowners equal to the s~pply of labour
from small farmers and landless labourers.
Now consider a land reform scheme which transfers all land to the
small fal"llers.

The consequent shift out in the production possibility fron

tier facing the small famers leads to a decline in the_amo\lilt of work they
are willing to perfom at any wage.

This result is illustrated in Figure IVa,

and is dependent on the assumption of the non-inferiority of leisure.

~

A supply of labour function can be defined as the ~um of the work
done by landless labourers and that done by small famers (given the amount
of land .they own) at any 11B.ge rate.

A demand for labour function can be

defined as the sum. of the amount of labour used on the 1._nq,originally be
lon~ing to small famers and on that originally belonging tp landowners.

In

the case under consideration, the fall in labour supplied py the small farmers
shifts the supply of labour function up.

The demand for l~bour schedule, deter

mined by the marginal product of labour (given the total &lftpunt of land) remains
constant.

As a result, the wage rises, output falls and both small farmers

and landless labourers are better off (Figure IVb).
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Thus, under assumptions of competition and non-homogeneous land, land
reform leads to output contraction in both cases A and B.

The welfare of

groups other than the expropriated landowners always increases.

While this

analysis provides an important benchmark, an assessment of the optimists•
position must consider the output implications of land reform when the market
failure and inefficiency explanations hold.

It is on the basis of these ex

planations that the optimists hold their views. -

-12Land Refom and the Market Failure Explanation,
A .market failure explanation of differences in output-land and labour

land ratios concentrates on imperfections in the land and labour markets in
ll>C agricultural sectors.

Many small fan1ters, given the amount of land they

own, the wage rate and the rental rate on land, would like either to tent more
land or to allocate part of their time to working off their farms.

Opportuni

ties for factor ratio adjustments of this nature may, however, be limited or
unavailable.

Small tamers are then confined to working only their own land.

These circU!ll.stances lead small famers to operate with higher output
land and labour-land ratios than large

f&l'fflS.

Equilibr1ll1'1 in the agricultural

sector under market failure is illustrated in Figures Va and b.

Figure Va

repeats the infomation on the S11tall farms contained in Figure IIIa.

Under

the assUl'llption of lllllrket failure, however, aquilibrillltl cannot occur at E
0
since E0 implies that small famers work FG hours on the farms of large land
owners.

Without this opportunity, equilibrium is reached :somewhere along the

arc HE1 , say at E2 •
F,quilibrium in the landowner-landless labourer sector is illustrated
in Figure Vb, which repeats the infonu.tion contained in Figure IIa.

The

marginal product of labour in the landowner sector (given by the slope of the
line e0 d equal to the slope of E D) exceeds that in the ~11 fam sector
1
(given by the slope of AB at E2 ).

On

assumptions of constant returns to scale

and identical production functions in the two sectors, the output-land and la
bour-land ratios are higher in the small fann sector.
Sinee the representation of the landowner sector under the market
failure and measurement explanations is identical, case A land reform has the
same outcome under both sets of assumptions.
considerably more complicated.

Case Bland reform, however, is

Assume, as in Figure IVb, that the supply of
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-14 and demand for lab our cur ves are ,
res pec tive ly, mo not oni call y inc rea
sing and
dec rea sin g.
Now con side r the pos t-re form wage~

At a wage les s tha n or equ al to

the wage giv en by the slop e of the
pro duc tion pos sib ilit y fro nti er at
E2,
sma ll fan ner s wil l do les s work than
pri or to the ref om sinc e the y now
own
more lan d (see Fig ure IVa ). Sin ce
this wage is les s tha n tha t rece ived
by
lan dle ss lab our ers in the pre -ref offl
situ atio n, lan dle ss lab our ers also
sup ply
les s lab our . Yet , sin ce bot h the
land form erly held by land own ers and
tha t
ori gin ally held by sma ll f'am ers is
worked more inte nsi vel y, the demand
f'or
lab our is hig her at thi s wage tha n
in the pre -ref orm situ atio n. The
refo re,
at a wage low er than tha t ass oci ate
d wit h poi nt E , demand for labou?exc eed s
2
the sup ply of lab our and equilib?-iUl
ll is not pos sib le.

At a wage betw een tha t imp lied by E
2 and the pre -ref orm wage giv en
at E1, the sup ply of lab our by lan
dle ss lab our ers con tinu es to fal l
sho rt of
its pre -ref onn . lev el. Sm all fal'l'fter
s, how eve r, may wis h to work more
tha n pre 
vio usl y. Two off set ting fac tor s infl
uen ce the sma ll farm ers. The imp
lici t
wage is now more fav our abl e tha n tha
t which the y were rec eiv ing at E ,
2 but
the add itio nal income der ive d from
the ir new lan ds act s to disc our age
add i
tio nal work. Sim ilar ly, ~he demand
for lab our may inc rea se or dec rea se.
The
lan ds which were alw ays owned by the
sma ll fan ner s are now worked les s
inte n
siv ely whi le the new ly acq uire d lan
ds are worked more inte nsi vel y. Con
seq uen tly,
it is pos sib le to hav e an equ ilib rim
n. in which pos t-re form wages are
low er tha n
at E (bu t hig her tha n at E ), lan
1
dle ss lab our ers are wor se off (th e
2
Ber ry
cas e) and eith er more or les s out put
is pro duc ed rel ativ e to the pre -ref
orm
situ atio n.
For wages exc eed ing the pre -re fom
wag e, lan dle ss lab our ers wis h to
sup ply more lab our than pre vio usl y.
Sma ll farm ers ma.y or may not wis h
to
work mor e; the ir dec isio n is bas ed
on the same con sid era tion s disc uss
ed abo ve.

-15Less labour is demanded since both the newly acquired and the original sms.11
farmer lands are worked less intensively.

Consequently, it is possible for

the post-reform. equilibrium to be characterized by higher wages and an improve
ment in landless labourer welfare.

Less output is produced.

Under the market failure hYPothesis, it is impossible for equilibrium
to be characterized by both an increase in output and an increase in the wel
fare of landless labourers.

The market failure hYPothesis leads to a rejection

of the optimists' position under both case A and Bland refoms.

-16Land Reform and and the Inefficiency Explanations
An inefficiency explanation asserts 'that large,,·often··absentee, land
owners fail to •perate in a rent maximising fashion.

The equilibrium of the

small farm sector under the inefficiency hypothesis is identical with its
position as illustrated in Figure IIIa.

Figure VI reproduces Figure IIIb with

the important additional assumption of landlord inefficiency.
Consider an equilibrium wage given by the slope of e 0 d equal to the
slop~s of gb and cf (and to that of EJ) in Figure IIIa).

Qnder the usual com

petitive assUlllptions, with small farmers working fb (equal to FG in Figure IIIa)
hours on landowners• land, landless labourers must be in equilibrium at point e 1
if e 0 d is to define the equilibrium. wage.

Otherwise, the demand for labour

(given by the marginal product of labour) would not equal the supply of labour
from small farmers and landless labourers.

Under an inefficiency hypothesis,

no such restriction can be placed on the equilibrium position since the demand
for labour is no longer given by the marginal product of la.hour.
Certain!. priori restrictions can, however, be p+aced on the equili
brium position.

Given the equilibrium wage, landless.labourers must be in

equilibrium. somewhere along cf.

Total wage payments for any amount of labour

along bo, say bl, are given by the height of the line gb corresponding to that
amount of labour ( e 1 in the case of bl).

3

Now, if landowners do not run their

faffls at a loss, the total amount of output produced must at least cover the
wage bill(.:!.•!!•, production must be along the segment he 3 in the case of bl).
These considerations restMct the production point (combination of
labour input and output) to the area agijhe 0 in Figure VI.

(The area jib is

excluded since at least fb of labour must be hired if e 0 d is to define an
equilibrium wage from the point of view of small fann.ers.)

The area agijhe

0

can be subdivided into three zones (a,~ and y) defined by the relationship
of the produetion ratios which prevail in each zone to the production ratios

-17 output

d

leisure
Figure "SZI
out ut

a
C

leisure
FigureW

-18of the small farmers {given by the point e0 ).

In zone a, both the labour

land and the output-land ratios are higher on the large, inefficient farms
than on the small farms.

In zone~• the labour-land r~tio is higher and the

output-land ratio is lower, and in zone y, both ratios are lower.
Only a production point in zone y is consistent with the empirical

production ratio pattern.

Unfortunately, there are no!. priori arguments

suggesting that a general presUil'lption of inefficiency leads to a production
point in zone y rather than in either of the other two zones. Thus, ineffi
ciency only provides for the possibility that production ratios correspond to
the observed pattern, it is not a sufficient condition.
Production and distribution implications of land reform can be ex
amined in the context of an inefficiency explanation if the production point
is assumed to lie in zone y, as the empirical evidence suggests.

Land refonn

under case A assumptions is illustrated in Figure VII which reproduces the
basic structure of Figure VI for an economy without small farmers.

Pre-refonn

equilibrium is characterized by a wage {given by the slope of the. lines e 0 d
and ch), a production point {e 2 ) and a point at which landless labourers ar-e
in equilibrium (e1).
If the pre-reform wage were to persist into the post-reforlit situation,
an analysis similar to that embodied in Figures !Ia and b establishes that
equilibriUil'l would be along ij, say at e •

3

e

3 does not, however, imply the

equality of the demand fo:r and supply-of labour, and equilibrium will finally
be reached along e0 k, say at e4 •
in comparison with point e 2 •

At 04, more or less output may be produced

The optimistic outcome is, therefore, possible

but not assured under the inefficiency explan11tion with case A assumptions.
It can similarly be shown; by analyzing the impact of land refol'ffl on
the demand for and supply of labour and

on

the intensity of cultivation, that

output may or may not increase under case B assumptions.

The wage must always

-1 9ri se , however, w
it h th e re su lt th
at la nd le ss la bo ur
er s ar e b et te r of
f.

'I

-20Conclusions:
Table I SUJIIJll&ri$eS the outcomes possible in each of the six land
reform models considered.

The heterogeneity of results underscores the :impor

tance of an explicit1.ntegration of the different explanations
tion ratio pattern into the analysis.

of

the produc

The optimists• view th.at land refol'Tll

always leads to a rise in output and an improvement in the welfare of all
groups other than expropriated landlords is clearly refuted.

Similarly, only

in the context of the market failure explanation can ~ne observe the Berry
result of an immiserization of the landless labourers.
The implications of intersectoral labour flows following on a land
reform program are easily established.

Assume that wages are initially

equal between sectors and that an inverse relation exists between wages and
the quantity of labour input deu.nded in the non-agricultural sector.

Recall

the assumption of·a fixed relative price between agric.ultu~al and non-agricul
tural goods.
If the post-reform (actual or illlplicit) agricultu:ral wage as deter
mined in the preceding three sections exceeds the pre-refor.111- wage, labour
will flow front the non-agricultural sector to the agricultural sector.

This

adjustment will lower the wage in agriculture and raise the wage in the other
sector until wage equality is restored.

The final equilibrium wage will be

intenuediate between the pre-reform wage and the post-reform wage as calculated
by the preceding partial equilibrium analysis.

Similar results are obtained

if the partial equilibri.Ulll analysis establishes that the pre.reform wage would
exceed the post-refom wage.

T~us, general equilibrium considerations stres

sing the intersectoral re-allocation of labour following on land refom do
not affect the quali-qttive conclusions of the partial equilibrium analysis as
displayed in Table I.
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